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“THE RIGHT COURSE, THE BEST COURSE, the only course” was a line used in a 1917
proclamation issued by the Patriotic Association of Newfoundland in an attempt
to persuade men to enlist. The phrase unwittingly summarized the history of vol-
untary recruitment during World War I. In the initial call for men in 1914, the “right
course” was to enlist in service to King and Empire. By 1917, as the colony wit-
nessed mounting casualties and a deteriorating economic situation, the “best
course” was for men to leave their positions within the intricate sphere of commu-
nity and family production to enlist. By 1918, an enlistment rate which did not
match casualties resulted in the colony’s beloved and distinguished regiment being
removed from the frontlines. The “only course” they could now follow was that of
conscription. Historians have argued that recruitment was limited by poor commu-
nications in a country with an isolated population,
1
or that high returns from the city
in the first year of the war lulled city officials in to a false belief that the regiment
could be staffed entirely by St. John’s men,
2
or even that high wartime fish prices
kept many outport men from enlisting.
3
While there is truth to these arguments, I
suggest that the system failed to produce a sufficient number of volunteers to main-
tain the Newfoundland Regiment at full strength because those responsible for re-
cruitment, chiefly Governor Walter E. Davidson and the Patriotic Association, did
not understand the socioeconomic reality of Newfoundland.
Between August 1914 and May 1918 the Patriotic Association and Depart-
ment of Militia faced the increasingly difficult task of drawing volunteers from a
geographically diffuse population for the Newfoundland Regiment, Royal New-
foundland Naval Reserve (RNNR), and Newfoundland Forestry Corps. To maintain
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the Regiment the colony had to draw men from all areas of the country, while work-
ing within a social and economic setting in which a large percentage of the country’s
male population was involved in the production of the colony’s staple resource,
fish. Failure to understand the importance of the individual in community and fam-
ily production in areas outside of St. John’s led to an overestimation of the colony’s
available manpower. By 1917, as the Department of Militia took over control of the
war effort from the Patriotic Association and as the Regiment continued to take a
high level of casualties, recruitment became a matter of urgency. But years of be-
lieving that there was a large body of idle outport men who remained home because
they were uneducated or unpatriotic, meant that little could now be done to increase
voluntary recruitment.
In-depth study of recruitment is a relatively recent trend within the historiogra-
phy of World War I. Historians now go beyond the notion that the call to “King and
Country” was the primary impetus to enlistment, and explore a wide and intercon-
nected web of motivations that caused men to join the military. Fortunately, we
have Chris Sharpe’s 1988 study “The Race of Honour: An Analysis of Enlist-
ments and Casualties in the Armed Forces of Newfoundland 1914-1918” and Mike
O’Brien’s recent work “Out of a Clear Sky: The Mobilization of the Newfoundland
Regiment, 1914-1915,” which question older notions of blind faith and unquestion-
ing loyalty. This essay examines the recruitment system in greater depth in an at-
tempt to understand the social and economic factors that limited its effectiveness.
This work also continues in the direction set by Sharpe, by exploring the “geogra-
phy” of Newfoundland’s war effort and builds on O’Brien’s important assessment
of how officials handled the war effort and supports his argument that the lack of
military structure in Newfoundland prior to the outbreak of hostilities had serious
consequences on the effective administration of the regiment. Where this essay dif-
fers from their work is in the importance it places on the difference between actual
levels of manpower available and what officials thought should be available. It also
places greater weight on the effect of casualties on the voluntary recruitment sys-
tem. Furthermore, I suggest that a fundamental lack of understanding of the socio-
economic life outside the capital city lead to serious problems throughout the war.
These problems, identified too late, remained uncorrected during the period of vol-
untary recruitment and coloured the way in which conscription was carried out un-
der the Military Service Act in 1918.
Finally, I attempt to shed light on those who volunteered for service and on
those who did not. Too often these men’s motives have been ignored by historians.
The decision not to enlist was as important as the decision to join up, and a discus-
sion of enlistment must attempt to understand both those who went overseas and
those who stayed home. Newfoundlanders internalized the official stance on the
war and decided whether or not to enlist based on their role within family and com-
munity production. For some, service in the King’s army was a viable route, for
others, even though they displayed great patriotism, it was not. Some men weighed
56 Martin
options and held off volunteering until an appropriate time, such as after a fishing or
lumber season, while others waited to leave their communities until the need for
men was absolutely certain. Whatever their reason for volunteering or staying
home, events in the late summer of 1914 affected all Newfoundlanders in some
way.
1914: OVERSEAS THERE CAME A PLEADING. THE CALL TO ARMS
AND THE FIRST 500
On 4 August 1914, the Daily News proclaimed “The British Empire is at war and all
Europe ablaze.”
4
The Newfoundland government’s response was quick and deci-
sive. Within four days Governor Davidson pledged Newfoundland’s support for
Britain, offered to raise a detachment of 500 men for overseas service, and increased
the Naval Reserve from 500 to 1000 men.
5
The colony then scrambled to enlist,
equip, and train the 500 soldiers. Though the public was patriotic and enthusiastic,
recruitment efforts were confused in the early days of August 1914. The colony
faced a challenge not encountered by other parts of the Empire. Newfoundland
was, since the removal of British forces in 1870,
6
devoid of any formal military or-
ganization through which it could raise, train, equip, and support the proposed 500
men destined for service as infantrymen.
7
The absence hindered the colony from
Davidson’s initial commitment of men, to the fractured and limited system of re-
cruitment that developed in the first few months.
What the colony lacked in established military organization, it made up for in
enthusiasm for Empire. The St. John’s elite greeted the war with a determination to
offer a “Newfoundland” contingent as opposed to providing manpower for the Ca-
nadian and British armies.
8
On 12 August, Davidson addressed an enthusiastic
group of citizens crowded into the Harvey Road Church Lads Brigade (CLB) ar-
mory in St. John’s. The gathering endorsed a resolution authorizing the establish-
ment of a committee of 25 citizens tasked with raising and equipping the contingent
for overseas service.
9
In an unusual move, the Newfoundland government placed
the country’s war effort under the control of Davidson’s newly formed Newfound-
land Patriotic Committee.
10
This committee, later renamed the Newfoundland Pa-
triotic Association, held its first meeting at the CLB armoury on the evening of 17
August. It established six sub-committees composed of local city leaders and offi-
cials to take charge of the recruitment, equipment, and transportation of the men.
11
When the Patriotic Association held its third meeting, 16 days after the declaration
of war, the colony had yet to begin recruiting, even though the government and As-
sociation had already received telegrams and letters from men throughout the is-
land declaring their intention to join up.
12
The Recruiting Committee blamed the
delay in opening general enlistment on the lack of an official proclamation calling
on men to volunteer. It reported that it had taken things as far as it could and had cre-
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ated a sub-committee headed by Doctor Cluny Macpherson to see to the medical
examination of volunteers. The Proclamation Committee then submitted a draft
which was amended and given to the Colonial Secretary, J.R. Bennett. During this
meeting a solid framework for enlistment and recruiting began to take shape.
13
The Nominating Committee wrote to the magistrates of all 18 electoral dis-
tricts compelling them to form branch offices of the Patriotic Association, to hold
public meetings to explain the country’s objective, and to compile and send for-
ward the names of willing citizens. Bennett sent 75 copies of the proclamation to
Inspector General John Sulliven of the Newfoundland Constabulary, and 100 cop-
ies to H.W. LeMessurier, Assistant Collector, requesting them to have their respec-
tive constables and sub-collectors to post the notices in prominent places outside
the city.
14
The Association also sent announcements to be posted in outport postal
and telegraph offices, and implored clergymen to encourage their congregations to
enlist.
15
Davidson made personal note of two responses made by clergymen on the
Avalon Peninsula in the first weeks of the war. Cannon White of the Anglican Ca-
thedral in St. John’s gave a sermon on the duty of all loyal British men to support the
Empire in its time of need. Farther down the coast Father Larry, parish priest of
Ferryland, emphatically told his congregation to rise to the occasion by exhorting
his parishioners: “These Germans, Shoot them! Go to the meeting and get ready to
fight. Kick them to blue blazes!”
16
By the end of August it was clear that the message had reached a majority of the
colony’s outlying towns. District magistrates telegraphed the Patriotic Association
informing it of the progress in establishing local branches of the Association. By 29
August, 20 branches had been formed and the response indicated that “a great wave
of patriotic enthusiasm is sweeping throughout the land.”
17
Letters written by men
expressing their desire to enlist further showed how far the message had spread in
the first few weeks.
18
But, since men had to make their way to St. John’s to sign up,
and the population was spread over a large geographic area, the colony had to over-
come the major barrier of distance. The Reid Newfoundland Company, Bowring
Brothers Company, and the Newfoundland Produce Company all offered to trans-
port volunteers to St. John’s free of charge.
19
The physical requirements also affected the numbers of those who could en-
list. The recruiting committee set a minimum standard of 5 foot 4 inches in height
with a chest expansion of 35 inches and a weight of 140 pounds,
20
standards similar
to those set by the British Army in 1914.
21
The large portion of volunteers rejected
as undersized proved that the initial standard was unrealistic for the Newfoundland
population, and it was drastically reduced in early 1915. In 1914, however, David-
son was proud of this standard and he suggested to the British Secretary of State,
Andrew Bonar Law, that the Newfoundlanders be attached to the Foot Guards and
sent to the Guards Depot upon arrival in England.
22
The Newfoundlanders were, he
claimed, “specially selected men, hardy and handy, enduring and disciplined and
crack shots.”
23
Not only were the men of the first contingent “hardy and handy,”
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they were overwhelmingly single. Financial considerations weighed heavily for
the government. Men with dependants posed a larger financial risk should they die
while in service to the country. On 18 September 1914 the Colonial Secretary re-
minded Davidson:
I have no doubt that your Excellency will use your best endeavors with the committee
so as to ensure so far as may be possible that the five hundred volunteers, who will
eventually be sent forward to represent the first Newfoundland Regiment, may be all
unmarried men or menwithout dependants upon them.
24
Davidson’s endeavors proved successful, on 28 September he announced the deci-
sion to keep “only sons” and married men with families from active service.
25
Once recruitment began on 21 August, men flocked to the C.L.B Armoury in
St. John’s to enlist.
26
It was no surprise that the young men of the four St. John’s ca-
det brigades, the CLB, Catholic Cadet Corps, Methodist Guards, and Newfoundland
Highlanders, formed a large percentage of the early enlistments. They were, as one
historian has aptly stated, “perhaps the nearest thing to a military force in New-
foundland in 1914.”
27
The CLB, for example, taught youth to embrace the ideals of
Christian manliness and to embody their motto “fight the good fight.” The training
they received ranged from physical and gymnastic exercise, to musical endeavors,
to a number of basic militaristic skills such as marksmanship, drill, signaling, and
first aid.
28
As of the 25th only 45 of the 285 men then enrolled in the regiment lacked
previous experience with military drill.
29
By 11 September, 880 men had been enrolled, with 520 deemed fit for service.
Of those volunteers 150 were men from outside the city, prompting the Patriotic
Association to suspend city recruitment in an effort to increase outport representa-
tion.
30
On 28 September, 970 men had officially been enrolled, 565 of whom were
training at the Pleasantville camp.
31
Once the number of men enrolled surpassed
Davidson’s original commitment, the Financial Committee decided to stop recruit-
ing throughout the Colony.
32
The five weeks of active recruitment had netted more
than a thousand volunteers, and produced a contingent of 537 men. Furthermore, of
the 32 magistrates contacted in the colony’s 18 electoral districts, 45 branch offices
of the Patriotic Association had been formed.
33
With recruitment closed, residents
of St. John’s lined the streets on the afternoon of 3 October to watch as 500 ill clad,
proud men of the Newfoundland Regiment made their way through the city amid
cries of “God Bless” and “Ye’ll be back in six weeks.” They marched towards the
Furness Withy Company wharf to board the S.S. Florizel, the hastily converted
steamer turned troopship designated to carry them to Britain.
34
Having raised, trained, and dispatched the promised 500 men, the Patriotic As-
sociation met on 23 October. It had no intention to raise additional men. The Finan-
cial Committee estimated it would cost the colony $520,000 to keep the men on
active service for one year. They did not account for funds for reserves, replace-
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ments, or new recruits to increase the size of the regiment. Towards the end of the
meeting, Prime Minister Edward Morris announced that a further draft of men
might be required to keep the regiment at its current strength. He then requested the
Association resume recruiting. Morris and Davidson established guidelines requir-
ing volunteers to attend the CLB armoury in St. John’s four nights a week for a pe-
riod of unpaid training. This included all outport volunteers, except where a suff-
icient number from one locality offered themselves for service. In such cases, an in-
structor might be sent to train the volunteers. Morris stated that “although justified
in the policy of preparing and training these men,” the government hoped they
would not be called to the front. The Patriotic Association then established the Re-
serve Force Committee, headed by Sir Joseph Outerbridge and the commanding of-
ficers of the cadet brigades, to take control of future recruiting efforts.
35
The new
recruits were intended to keep the regiment at its original strength.
In mid November the British informed the colony that it had to raise a reserve
force that consisted of no less than 50 per cent of the unit before the Regiment could
be put into the field. These 250 recruits would replace potential casualties.
36
The
British Army Council also informed the colony that the regiment needed to be in-
creased to the British standard of 1080 men with an additional 250 man reserve for
it to be put into service.
37
Though the colony knew the manpower standards of regi-
ments in the British army, by late December it had not developed any plan to in-
crease the size of the contingent. When recruitment resumed on 30 November the
Association intended to raise only the 250 men. As with the call to form the first
contingent, the days following the reopening of enlistment saw a renewed patriotic
fervor. Ten days after the call for men, 607 (68 from outports) had been enrolled,
but only 170 were found fit to serve.
38
The Patriotic Association continued to be concerned by the poor return from
outport communities. Most historians have recognized that the number of outport
men available in August of 1914 was significantly reduced by the summer fishery
and as such they were naturally under-represented, but did not examine the number
who were actually fishing. The 1911 Newfoundland census listed 43,795 males
involved in the catching and curing of fish, out of a total male population of
122,542.
39
Assuming men worked between 10 to 65 years of age, Newfoundland
had a total male workforce of 86,230.
40
Thus, just over 50 per cent of the male
workforce was in the fishery and not in a position to enlist in the summer of 1914.
Since fishing was largely conducted outside the city, outport men were overwhelm-
ingly unable to enlist. In 1914, 78 per cent of all 202 outport volunteers worked in
an industry other than fishing. In mid August, the Nominating Committee received
a number of telegraphs from magistrates outlining the local situations. Many told
the same story. The magistrate in Wesleyville reported he had not held a recruit-
ment meeting “owing to men being on Labrador and elsewhere and with advice of
others thought it advisable to let meeting stand over ... will hold meetings shortly so
as to meet men returning home.” In Harbour Breton it was noted that “most all of
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our young men are on the Banks those at home are mostly too old to volunteer,”
while the magistrate in Brigus regretted that “unfortunately most of our young men
are away on the Labrador and elsewhere at the present time and we may not be able
to get many volunteers until their arrival.”
41
The Patriotic Association paid little attention to the reasons why men did not
enlist. When the call to form the second contingent went out in the end of Novem-
ber, the Association and its Reserve Force Committee had not taken steps to en-
courage outport volunteers. In fact, the system of recruitment established in Oct-
ober 1914 restricted the enlistment of outport men. The Patriotic Association fur-
ther complicated outport enlistment when it decided that an area had to have no less
than 50 volunteers to justify sending a training officer. The editor of a city newspa-
per criticized the new system of recruitment by pointing out “it will not be possible
for a young man of Pouch Cove to walk into town for Monday night’s drill, return
home that night and walk in again for Tuesday night’s drill.”
42
While enlisting was
impractical for men within walking distance of St. John’s, it was impossible for
men of outlying districts. It was unrealistic to expect an individual to leave home to
live in the city paying all expenses out of pocket while attending unpaid training.
The Reserve Force Committee admitted as much when it abandoned the system in
favour volunteers receiving continuous paid training.
43
Although that eased the fi-
nancial concerns for outport volunteers, and had the desired effect,
44
outport com-
munities were still limited in the number of men they could send. One person in
Hearts Content wrote that the elimination of the Home Service, in which men en-
listed but remained in their communities until needed, restricted the number of vol-
unteers that could be drawn from the area. He believed that his community should
train recruits.
45
Though Dr. Wilfred Grenfell of St. Anthony raised similar concerns
in early 1915, the training of all volunteers continued to be conducted in St. John’s.
Other factors also limited the number of outport volunteers. Writing in February
1916, Caleb Tuck of Shoal Harbour outlined what he felt had been a major obstacle
to outport enlistment, the inadequate pass system set up to transport men from the
outports to the city. Under this system men were provided for only while in transit.
Delays and stopovers often resulted in men going hungry or being stranded over-
night without lodging. The situation was much the same across the island and as
such, he stated, it was no wonder that more men did not volunteer.
46
At the end of 1914 the Newfoundland Regiment was stationed in Scotland
training and waiting for the reinforcements that would allow it to be placed on the
frontlines. In the two months of active recruitment the colony had raised 779 men
for the first two contingents.
47
Of those, 202 were from districts other than St.
John’s East and West while 19 men listed areas other than Newfoundland and Lab-
rador as their home town on their attestation papers.
48
Davidson’s original offer of 500 men for overseas service had caused a number
of problems. The “first five hundred” became iconic in Newfoundland, but that ar-
bitrary number was not based on an understanding of the structure of the British
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army. Davidson had also not considered the effect sustained conflict could have on
a combat unit. It is hard to say what the impact of a wildly patriotic recruitment
campaign combined with an extremely limited quota of men had on the attitude of
the population, but it is possible to draw a correlation with what occurred in Britain.
By early September 1914, the British Army found itself struggling to deal with an
unexpected number of volunteers. Recruitment depots were swamped with men
who waited hours for their chance to join up. In an attempt to stem the flood and
gain some measure of control, the War Office instituted a system whereby men
were examined and attested, and placed into a reserve to be called up when the army
was ready for them. The council also increased the minimum physical requirements
to 5 foot 6 inches with a chest expansion of 35.5 inches. While these measures
brought recruitment under control, they also had an unexpected result. Many poten-
tial volunteers felt that since the War Office was picking and choosing men for ser-
vice, it might not need the number of recruits that had originally been suggested.
49
In the early stages of recruitment in Newfoundland the Patriotic Association
too had carefully selected men, motivated by the concern to limit financial obliga-
tion to dependents. Moreover, its decision to stop recruiting and then resume a lim-
ited system of recruitment in the late fall, restricted the number of outport men
enrolled. Many patriotic young men were unable to enlist in a regiment and cause
they supported. The unwillingness to increase the size of the regiment beyond the
minimum required, motivated by a desire to minimise cost and the lack of under-
standing of the need to replace casualties, affected recruitment in the following
year.
1915: FALL IN THE FIRING LINE. CONTINUOUS RECRUITMENT
AND GALLIPOLI
Recruitment in 1915 was marked by an atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty
within both the Government and the Patriotic Association. Debates ranged over the
appropriate level of commitment and the period for which recruitment would con-
tinue. By mid year, this uncertainty affected other areas of the war effort, forcing
the head of the Equipment Committee to demand that Newfoundland set a goal for
recruitment to purchase items needed to clothe the regiment. That the regiment re-
mained out of active service for most of the year fostered uncertainty about the
number of recruits required. That changed by October, after the regiment’s arrival
in Gallipoli when Davidson announced the first combat casualties. The govern-
ment quickly abandoned its recruitment quotas and resolved to send its last man in
aid of the Empire.
Even after the restrictions on the number of men accepted were dropped, the
Patriotic Association overestimated the level of manpower available, which led to
an unrealistic view of what the colony could commit. The year opened with a repeat
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of the earlier call for 250 men to form a reserve. By 14 January 1915, 300 had re-
ported for drill at the armoury, with 245 of those on parade already sworn in.
50
The
Governor made it clear that the second contingent was a reserve only. Its arrival in
Britain was significant only in that it allowed the first contingent to be placed on ac-
tive service. Davidson recognized the British Army’s concern over this irregular
sized unit, but stated that there had never been a formal proposal to raise a full regi-
ment. He suggested that there was no present need for such an increase, as any fu-
ture thought of doing so depended on the number of volunteers who presented
themselves for service.
51
There is some indication that the government and the
Patriotic Association had finally given in to Army Council requests. Regimental
Quarter Master Captain Outerbridge queried the total number of men to be enlisted
so that he could order equipment. The Association told him to procure equipment
for 1330 men, a full battalion of 1080 plus a 250 man reserve.
52
During the first three months of 1915 the Patriotic Association targeted outport
communities through a recruiting party that toured various sections of the island’s
coast.
53
While heralded as a success in late March, in hindsight the tours highlighted
several problems with the campaign. These problems, however, were not fully re-
cognised until late 1917, by which time little could be done. The Patriotic Associa-
tion conducted three outport recruitment tours that winter. The Evening Telegram
published “Notes on Patriotic Tour” and ran between 13 February and 1 March
1915. The author, I.C. Morris, a well known St. John’s businessman, praised com-
munity leaders and listed the number of men who volunteered for each branch of
service after the presentations. His 18 February report, however, showed a marked
departure. A man in the Bay of Islands area confronted the recruiting party over the
merits of the conflict. Morris stated that,
the man was representative of others of his class which are to be met with in every
community ... they apparently forget that the Empire has been built up by the sacrifice
and blood of its sons.
Recruiters felt that the inhabitants of Bay of Islands had room for a “greater public
spirit.”
54
At Channel, the group was again surprised by the level “carelessness and
indifference.” Morris felt the situation could be alleviated by regularly reminding
and educating people on Newfoundland’s position with in the Empire. “There has
been serious neglect in this aspect of our public life and it should be the duty of
those in authority to give the matter some little consideration.”
55
While not recognized at the time, weariness to enlist among people on the west
coast may not have been the product of a lack of education. The Naval Reserve had
long had trouble recruiting in the region, due to the Navy’s past involvement in en-
forcing treaty rights on the French Shore by expelling Newfoundlanders who had
encroached on French fishing grounds.
56
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Morris highlighted what he saw as three factors that affected recruitment in the
colony. First, there was a lack of “public spirit” in the outports and without some
form of education as to the war and the Empire’s role, recruitment in rural areas
would be a constant struggle. Secondly, the Patriotic Association relied heavily on
community leaders in outports to pave the way for their recruiting parties. Finally,
was that although there was an air of uncertainty, men in outport areas were willing
to leave their homes to enlist. W.C. Job echoed Morris’s findings when he pointed
out that government had provided little in the way of support for recruitment.
57
Morris and Job both indicated that the government and the Patriotic Association
needed to take a visible and active roll in outport recruitment. They could not afford
to continue to sit back and compel local community leaders to take responsibility
for volunteers. Furthermore, given the geographic distribution of people, recruiters
could not assume that the high level of patriotic sentiment that existed in the city
was matched everywhere. Their concerns seem to have been lost in the wake of a
sharp increase in total enlistments that occurred in March of that year.
On 30 March, the Reserve Force Committee reported that since the first con-
tingent, an additional 1,460 men had volunteered and over 690 had been sworn in.
A second and a third contingent had left for overseas, with a fourth ready to go.
Based on what appeared to be a high level of volunteers and given that they had not
as of yet reached their quota of 1,330 men the Prime Minister extended recruit-
ment.
58
Recruitment seemed to be progressing well, but the quota and centraliza-
tion of training limited the number of men that could join the regiment. Grenfell, for
example, requested permission to form a small company to train and drill the volun-
teers in St. Anthony, which he thought would “create great enthusiasm” within the
area and encourage more men to step forward.
59
Davidson replied that the Reserve
Force Committee advised against such a plan and all volunteers had to be sent to the
city.
60
The situation was much the same for Labrador. On 1 April 1915, Mr. Swaf-
field of Cartwright contacted the Governor to enquire if volunteers were still
needed in St. John’s as he had 15 men wanting to enlist. Davidson, who admitted to
knowing little of conditions in Labrador, requested help from the Reserve Force
Committee in drafting his reply. He informed Swaffield that the men would gladly
be welcomed but urged Swaffield not to “denude the coast of Labrador or leave
families without adequate support.”
61
Dr. Paddon, of the Grenfell mission, spoke of
a general ignorance of the area in a letter he wrote in 1917. More than just physical
distance from St. John’s limited the number of Labrador men who volunteered, he
thought. Enlistment from Labrador remained well below the average throughout
the war.
Captain Outerbridge explicitly pointed out that extending recruitment served
to further confuse the situation. In April he again demanded to know what the gov-
ernment’s recruitment goal was, since extending recruitment at the last moment
caused problems in his ability to obtain kit. For Outerbridge, the system of ad hoc
extensions based on the number of men volunteering had to stop. He warned the
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Reserve Force Committee that if it did not adopt a definite program of recruitment it
would be impossible to make contracts with the various companies supplying kit.
62
The colony continued to raise a series of contingents, in the form of lettered compa-
nies, without knowing if each company raised would be the last. By 5 August 1915
the Reserve Force Committee had enlisted 145 men into the ranks of G Company.
63
Fifteen days later, 1,076 men of the Newfoundland Regiment, who had spent ten
months in Britain, embarked at Devonport aboard HMS Megantic to begin their ac-
tive service in the Mediterranean. A month later, they landed in Suvla Bay.
The first regimental casualties changed attitudes. The first fatality came on 22
September when Private Hugh McWhirter was killed by a shell, the second hap-
pened the following day, when Private W.F. Hardy was shot by a sniper.
64
As the
regiment grew accustomed to the routine of cycling through the front, reserve, and
rest areas, its casualties mounted. On 13 October 1915 Davidson announced that
they had just received word that the regiment had suffered 27 men wounded, 3
killed in action, and 5 who had died from disease. Morris announced that New-
foundland should be prepared to give its last man and dollar in defense of the Em-
pire, and recommended the continuation of recruitment for as long as necessary.
The leader of the opposition, J.M. Kent, agreed and for the first time the colony had
a recruitment program that was not limited by financial concerns.
65
Throughout the remainder of the year, as the British Expeditionary Force held
on to its section of Turkish coast, the regiment continued to take casualties. Al-
though the Patriotic Association received updates, few understood that the regi-
ment was losing men despite not yet being involved in a major battle. By 15
November, a month and a half after arriving in Gallipoli, the Newfoundlanders had
taken 103 casualties including 20 fatalities.
66
The continued flow of volunteers in
Newfoundland combined with a battalion reserve higher than the minimum 250
men had fostered an overconfidence about the number of recruits the colony could
mobilize. Talk of forming a second battalion for active service had started.
67
Major
Whitaker, the commander of the Newfoundland reserve force in Scotland, had
written Davidson advising that his unit be officially designated the 2nd Battalion to
allow it to function more efficiently within the British army system. The Reserve
Force Committee accepted establishment of the 2nd Battalion under the condition
that it remain a reserve for the 1st Battalion. Davidson, unrealistically, believed that
if the war continued the colony would need to raise three or four battalions to ensure
it did its fair share in saving the Empire.
68
Amid the discussion of establishing another battalion of 1,330 men, few peo-
ple, not even Davidson, made mention of Major Whitaker’s 11 October 1915 letter
in which he raised concern over enlistment. Whitaker warned that unless he soon
received men and trained them, they would be unable to keep 1st Battalion at full
strength.
69
In the four fractured months of recruitment in 1914 the colony produced
779 recruits. In 1915 after a full year of hesitant, yet continuous, recruitment 1,418
men had signed up. By the time the Newfoundland regiment left Turkey it had suf-
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fered 517 casualties. The regiment’s time in the lines resulted in 45 fatalities, 80
wounded, and 392 in hospital not yet discharged.
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Although many of those in hos-
pital returned to active service, by the time the regiment left Gallipoli it had lost half
the men that landed at Suvla, and 27 per cent of its overall strength. The new deter-
mination that followed news of the first casualties in October, however, remained
unchecked as the regiment prepared to enter the Western Front.
1916: INTO BATTLE. BEAUMONT HAMEL AND THE WESTERN
FRONT
1916 proved to be watershed year for Newfoundland. The casualties suffered near
Beaumont Hamel marked the largest loss of life in a single day, but continuous time
in the trenches and further combat resulted in casualties that far outweighed those
taken on 1 July. That year also marked the point in the war in which concerns arose
about the ability to maintain an effective fighting force through voluntary recruit-
ment. Attitudes within the government and Patriotic Association changed greatly.
The Association’s, and Davidson’s, optimism faded by the fall as the level of vol-
unteers shrank and they realized that replacement of casualties consumed a large
percentage of all recruits.
As the Newfoundland regiment rested, trained, and refit in their camp outside
Suez, Egypt,
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the Patriotic Association implemented new strategies to raise 2000
recruits that year.
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While it optimistically expected to double the previous year’s
recruitment, it failed to correct problems within its system that limited the number
of men that came forward. The early months of 1916 saw a continued interest in
the formation of the 2nd Battalion. On 1 February the British Secretary of State
approved of establishing the 2nd Battalion with the proviso that it remain a reserve
for the 1st Battalion until the Newfoundland government could guarantee it had
sufficient reinforcements to sustain both battalions in the field.
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Davidson re-
sponded that 2nd Battalion would be kept in reserve in case “the young men avail-
able in Newfoundland do not care to volunteer,” but it was the colony’s ultimate
goal to raise two full strength battalions for the frontlines. He believed that by do-
ing so Newfoundland would not fall behind the other Dominions who had all in-
creased their original offer ten fold.
74
Davidson informed the Secretary of State
that the Patriotic Association had been authorised to recruit “without limit.” The
establishment of the 2nd Battalion meant an increase of their contingent abroad
from 2,000 to 5,000 men.
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Others were less optimistic about fielding a second battalion. Colonel A.L.
Hadow, commanding officer of 1st Battalion, voiced his objections to the official
designation of 2nd Battalion. Hadow argued that 2nd Battalion would quickly
lose sight of its role as reserve force thereby drawing much needed reinforce-
ments away from the 1st in its attempt to establish themselves as a frontline unit.
76
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Meanwhile, Colonial Secretary Bennett worried about the ability to draw the re-
quired recruits from the country’s population. He reported that as of 31 December
1915 Newfoundland had, between Army, Navy, those rejected, and those who
joined other empire forces, offered up 4,552 men. Bennett noted that 1/10th of the
total “manhood” of a nation was capable of service, so about 24,000 Newfound-
land men could potentially enlist. While that number seemed large, it had to be
understood that “in the case of a sparsely populated country such as Newfound-
land where the staple industry of fishing is carried on by young and able-bodied
men the number available for active service can only reach a comparatively small
proportion of this total.” Bennett went on to argue that despite this, ministers
contiued to hold the opinion that a larger number would volunteer if they could be
made to understand the importance of the Empire and their place within it.
77
Al-
though ignored, Bennett’s report highlighted the major difficulty of voluntary re-
cruitment in Newfoundland, geographic distribution of population and labour.
The bulk of the colony’s male population of service age lay outside St. John’s, yet
the city had the highest concentration of men between 18 and 35 years old. The
populations of the outlying districts were dispersed throughout a number of small
towns many of which had populations numbering less than 100 people.
Excluding the districts that comprised the area of Conception Bay, Fortune
Bay is representative of the population distribution of outlying districts.
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In 1911
the district consisted of 107 towns, of which 56 had populations under 100, while
13 had populations under 10. A further 32 towns had total populations between 101
and 300. Only 6 had a total population over 300 people, the highest of which, Gar-
nish, had 640 residents (for a comparison to other outlying districts see Table 1).
Fortune Bay had 5,209 males, of which 2,351, 45 per cent, were fishermen. Of the
total male population, 1,775 ranged between the ages of 15 and 35. By breaking it
down further one can see the heavy reliance on young men for the fishery. Of the
318 males in Garnish, 91 were 10 years of age or younger. Out of a total potential
male work force of 227, the 164 involved in the fishery accounted for 72 per cent.
At the other end of the spectrum, Long Harbour Beach had a total population of six,
of whom half were male. Two men were between the ages of 20 and 30 while the
other was between 75 and 80, and not surprisingly Long Harbour Beach had two
men listed as fishermen.
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In many cases it was not, as Davidson had stated, that
young men did not care to volunteer, rather they were unable to enlist due to their
position within the economic structure of their towns. Many telegrams and letters
support this fact. By 1916 the government received a considerable number of re-
quests to release young men who had volunteered for service. Many asked for the
return of under age boys, but a sizable portion requested the return of sons as old as
24. Regimental officials declined the release of most men. The case of Noah
Mullett of Wesleyville was typical. The regiment informed him that although his
son George was the only help he had, once attested, a man could not be released
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Table 1

















Bonavista 11,972 4,064 109 8 34 48 19
Twillingate 11,875 4,181 198 14 121 48 15
Trinity 11,372 3,717 146 9 79 36 22
Placentia
St. Mary’s 8,368 2,758 139 11 74 41 13
St. Georges 6,225 1,961 113 14 64 27 8
Burin 5,850 1,824 77 7 34 29 7
St. Barbe 5,578 1,899 177 37 114 22 4
Fortune Bay 5,209 1,775 107 13 57 32 5
Fogo 4,388 1,579 72 10 37 20 5
Burgeo-La
Poile 4,095 1,345 56 7 24 19 6
Ferryland 3,029 866 30 0 16 6 8
Labrador 2,052 693 110 41 57 11 1
1Based on 1911 Newfoundland Census. Excluding the districts of Harbour Main, Port de
Grave, Bay de Verde, Harbour Grace, Carbonear, St. John’s East and St. John’s West.
Though not an electoral district, this table includes Labrador.
from service.
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The picture throughout the outlying districts is in sharp contrast to
that of St. John’s.
In 1911 the city had a total population of 45,685 with a total male population
of 22,233, of whom 7,469 were of serviceable age.
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Moreover, close to half of
the city’s labour force was employed in trade and manufacturing.
82
By 1914 labour-
ers made up the single largest group of workers in the city.
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Labour in St. John’s,
particularly that of dockworkers, was characterized by “sporadic employment, a
stratified work force, and an oversupply of labour.” In 1914 only 19 per cent of
dockworkers were considered permanent employees, the rest subsisted on a day-
by-day basis and few worked more than nine months out of the year.
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Thus, unlike
in the outports, a considerable body of men who were not integrally woven into
family and community production existed.
Other industries could not spare young men either. In Harbour Grace, Archi-
bald Brothers Ltd. telegraphed the Governor requesting that Stephen Payne, the




Davidson addressed concerns in Hearts Content where the An-
glo Telegraph Company was harmed by recruitment in the town. The problem, ac-
cording to the manager, was that it took time and effort to train a new operator and
nine company employees had already broken their contract to enlist.
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The Gover-
nor also received letters from men such as Joseph Evans of Grand Bank, who re-
quested help enlisting.
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Many of the young men in the outports were too tightly
woven into the economic production of the area to enlist. While the Patriotic Asso-
ciation called on all men to enlist immediately and worry about the cost later, the
colony never found a way to overcome these obstacles.
There were further problems that limited the number of enlistments. By 1916
the colony had long abandoned its strict physical standards. In March 1915 the
standard was drastically reduced from 5 foot 4 inches, 140 pounds to 5 feet, 112
pounds.
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Even under the reduced physical standard a large number of men were re-
jected for being under sized. In 1916, 352 of the 996 men rejected were excluded
for “Poor Physique,” a category that included men too light, too small, and under-
age. In fact nearly half of all volunteers were rejected in 1916.
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The rejection
rate prompted the medical staff of the Association to allow men with a minor de-
fect to be taken on strength and sent for corrective medical procedures after which
they would be posted to full duties and pay.
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Unlike in 1914, the continuous need
for men to fill two battalions meant that the colony could no longer afford to pick
the best candidates. Even with relaxed standards nearly half of all recruits were re-
jected (see Table 2).
The Patriotic Association realized that enlistment rates did not support its
ultimate goal; few understood why and chalked it up to lack of enthusiasm of the
young men. The Association hoped to induce a sense of patriotism and loyalty among
the men through intensified recruitment campaigns. On 10 April 1916 Davidson
announced that once the men under training in St. John’s were dispatched their ob-
ligation to 1st and 2nd Battalion would be well met and the colony could then turn
its attention to a third battalion. He advocated a “whirlwind” recruiting campaign
with the goal of netting 1,000 to 1,200 more men that year.
91
With the regiment in France recruitment could not keep pace with losses. Be-
tween 1 February and 26 May 1916, 712 men had been added to the regiment,
though a large number of these men had volunteered in 1915.
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By mid summer the
regiment’s three months on the Western Front had resulted in devastating casual-
ties. The fighting on 1 July 1916 had resulted in 710 casualties, which included 233
fatalities.
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Four month’s reinforcements did not offset the losses of one month. Af-
ter Beaumont Hamel, the Regiment was pulled off the line to a reserve area in
France to be refit. Men from 2nd Battalion replaced the casualties, but these rein-






Year Total Accepted Rejected Percent Rejected
19142 1,005 757 248 24.63
19154 2,744 1,418 1,326 48.3
1916 2,210 1,087 1,123 50.8
1917 2,005 1,031 974 48.5
1918 868 411 457 52.6
Military Service Act Passed 11 May 1918
Total 8,832 4,704 4,128 46.7
Total for War
Including Conscripts 12,461 6,277 6,184 49.6
1Based on Department of Militia Report. Government of Newfoundland. Report of the
Department of Militia. (St. John’s: Harold Print, 1919) 14-15.
2The number for 1914 is not exact given that the Department of Militia included men re-
cruited in December 1914 in their yearly totals for 1915.
3The sizable difference in rejection rates between 1914 and the rest of the war may be
explained by the fact that a large number of original volunteers were men and boys from
the denominational cadet brigades, who placed great importance on physical well being
and exercise.
4As noted above the numbers for 1915 are not exact. The report listed December 1914
and January-February 1915 as one total thus making an amendment to the totals not pos-
sible based on the data presented.
ment was placed back in the line. In the battle of Gueudecourt losses totalled 120 fa-
talities and a further 119 wounded.
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It was not until mid winter, however, that the casualties affected the perception
of recruitment in Newfoundland. Despite the fact that the average for 1916 was 90
men per month, in early November Davidson optimistically resolved to secure 150
recruits per month.
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By December, however, Major Whitaker informed Davidson
that based on current levels 2nd Battalion could only provide the 1st Battalion with
100 men per month for four months after which the number would drop to 50 per
month.
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By now the colony realized it was facing a serious problem and a directive
issued on 9 December 1916 highlighted the situation. The Patriotic Association re-
solved that all government employees between 18 and 35 who were fit and single,
would be given notice to the effect that “they must volunteer or in consequence of
failure to do so, forfeit their positions with the government. These positions to be
filled by those of our boys incapacitated and honourably discharged.”
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The opti-
mism of early 1916 had faded and talk of fielding a second combat battalion disap-
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peared. Despite the earlier optimism, 1916 witnessed a significant drop in the total
enlistments. 2,210 men volunteered for service in the regiment that year of which
1,087 were accepted. Compared to 1915 this was a decline of 534 total volunteers
and a 331 man decrease of those taken on strength.
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The colony was left with the increasingly difficult task of drawing recruits from a
population which, for the most part, could not enlist. Failing to realize that the lack of
volunteers was anything other than the result of unpatriotic, uninterested, or unedu-
cated young men, the Patriotic Association maintained that an appeal to their sense of
Empire was needed to induce men to enlist. Although the Newfoundland Regiment
continued to serve with distinction on the Western Front, 1917 marked a low point for
recruitment and the beginning of the end of the voluntary recruitment system.
1917: THE THIN LINE. HEAVY CASUALTIES AND MANPOWER
CRISES
When in January 1917 it was clear that the number of volunteers was inadequate, the
idea of mandatory service gained support even as fear that conscription would under-
mine support for the government hardened the Patriotic Associations resolve that a pa-
triotic call to duty would suffice. The belief in the existence of a large untapped source
of manpower was encouraged by reports that looked at total population rather than the
section of the population able to serve. Despite difficulties maintaining the regiment,
Davidson and the Association proposed forming a Forestry Corps in mid year, com-
pounding the recruitment problems. Davidson exacerbated the situation further when
he offered to form three independent labour units for active service. The formation of
the Department of Militia that summer did little to alleviate the situation.
On 19 January 1917 the Recruiting Committee reported that between 7 Nov-
ember 1916 and the first day of the New Year it had received 372 volunteers, only
half of whom were accepted. Furthermore the strength of those training in St. John’s
caused concern as of the 459 men present, 25 were unfit for active service, having
been returned home from Europe. The Patriotic Association debated the establish-
ment of a system of registration, which ended in a resolution that “there be an in-
struction to the Recruiting Committee to take into consideration some effective
scheme for the purpose of stimulating enlistment in the King’s Army and Navy.”
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The recruitment tactics remained markedly similar to those established in
1915. On 27 February Colonial Secretary Bennett and some returned soldiers and
sailors toured the south coast of Newfoundland.
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By the end of March the standing
of the 1st Battalion had been increased from 899 to 1,125 men, while the 2nd Battal-
ion stood at 606, of whom 171 were not qualified for active service. W.W. Blackall
reported that a relatively small percentage of men in all districts had volunteered,
leading Mr. MacNab to call for men of “light and leading” in outport communities
to encourage recruitment.
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While the Association made yet another emotional ap-
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peal to the outports, it failed to realize that community leaders could do little to
change the fact that there was not a large body of men available for service. Blackall
had calculated his percentages based on all volunteers, rejected and accepted for the
regiment as a proportion of the total population of each district. This was inherently
misleading as it failed to recognize that only a limited portion of the population in
any district could enlist. A comparison of Blackall’s returns with those calculated
using percentages based on men between 15 and 35 years of age as listed in the 1911
census and men enlisted in the regiment as calculated in 2008 provides a clearer
picture. While Blackall’s work included men who volunteered up to 17 March
1917, the comparative figures only include men up to 31 December 1916 (See Ta-
ble 3). Blackall’s report showed that St. John’s had offered 8 per cent of its popula-
tion, Trinity approximately 4 per cent, and St. Georges 3 per cent. Among males
between the ages of 15 and 35, St. John’s offered 17 per cent, Trinity 7 per cent, and
St. Georges 6 per cent. These figures undercount those serving since they do not in-
clude men who were rejected, volunteered for the Naval Reserve, enlisted in other
Allied forces, or were ineligible to enlist due to a pre-existing medical condition or
injury.
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By mid winter, the government and the Patriotic Association were discussing
mandatory service, but Davidson felt that conscription was not politically viable.
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While the war had brought a measure of cooperation between political parties, it
had not put an end to partisan hostilities. Tension between the government and the
opposition had increased in the wake of the Legislative Council’s refusal to pass the
Sealing Bill in 1914.
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Furthermore, after wartime profiteering scandals and an in-
crease in taxation, Morris’ 1914 concern over his ability to win the next election
was proving to be justified.
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A “conscription election” had the potential to be di-
sastrous to the incumbent party.
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Davidson decided conscription should not be
imposed, but instead he would accompany a recruitment tour to the districts of
Bonavista, Trinity, Carbonear, and Bay de Verde, in an attempt to put some weight
to the recruiting appeal.
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The newest campaign called on men’s duty to support the empire, but also spoke
of a deteriorating economic crisis within the colony. In 1915 the Water Street mer-
chants who dominated both the export and coastal trade of the colony, sold many of
their steel steamers. Only two steamers, the S.S. Florizel and the S.S. Stephano, re-
mained in service, which limited supply and increased the price of fuel and food, and
seriously restricted the export of fish.
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By mid 1917 Davidson informed the British
Secretary of State warning that unless steamers were made available the country
could not export that season’s catch. Davidson feared the situation would result in the
“financial collapse of the colony.”
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The new recruiting proclamation played on this
growing sense of urgency by directly relating shortages experienced to the war. It im-
plored men to enlist before years’ end as it was doubtful that ships could bring the
food and fuel required for the next year. Appealing to the patriotic sentiment of
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Table 3
A Comparison of Blackall’s 1917 District Recruiting Returns:
Total Population vs. Male Population 15-35
Returns Calculated in 1917
Based on Total Population
1
_________________________________
Returns Calculated in 2008















St. John’s5 45,685 8.36 7,469 17.3
Bonavista 22,895 2.56 4,064 4.9
Twillingate 22,705 2.81 4,181 7.3
Trinity 21,788 3.79 3,717 6.9
Placentia &
St. Mary’s
16,099 2.02 2,758 4.3
Harbour Grace 11,925 4.07 1,922 5.3
St. George 11,861 2.78 1,961 6.3
Burin 11,616 2.53 1,824 4.6
St. Barbe 10,481 2.45 1,899 3.1
Bay de Verde 10,215 1.56 1,696 2.7
Fortune Bay 9,989 1.46 1,775 3.4
Harbour Main 9,471 2.65 1,638 5.1
Fogo 8,257 2.89 1,579 5.5
Burgeo-La Poile 7,793 1.36 1,345 4.3
Port de Grave 6,986 2.81 1,087 3.21
Ferryland 5,793 1.81 866 4.5
Carbonear 5,114 2.05 816 2.9
1
PANL, MG 632, File 1, Patriotic Association of Newfoundland Meeting, 23 March 1917.
2Census of Newfoundland and Labrador 1911, Table 1. Population, Sex, Denomination,
Profession & c. (St. John’s: J.W. Withers, 1914); and PANL Index of Surnames of the
Royal Newfoundland Regiment 1914-1918.
3Blackall’s report represents accepted and rejected volunteers up to 17 March 1917.
4Represents accepted volunteers only up to 31 December 1916.
5Includes both St. John’s East and St. John’s West districts.
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mothers and fathers the proclamation stated “the right course, the best course, the
only course is for the young men to leave their work for others to do this year and go
help to win the war.”
110
A letter received from Albert J. Hallett of Musgrave Harbour caused Davidson
to proclaim that there was such “a State of ignorance in relation to this great war and
the principles that are underlying the struggle that one cannot wonder why so few re-
cruits came from the North.” He responded to the letter by outlining action that
needed to be taken to bring the outports into line.
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Another letter spoke to the grow-
ing fracture between city and outport. Mr. Dubordieu of Port-au-Port wrote Morris
complaining of the treatment of outport men who enlisted. After his son was passed
over for promotion, Dubordieu believed there was validity in the notion “daily gain-
ing credence” in the outports that their men were continually passed over for promo-
tion and distinction. He believed this sentiment played a part in limiting the number
of men volunteering.
112
Dr. Paddon echoed this when he commented on the lack of re-
sponse from Labrador men by citing familial obligations and a growing feeling that
the city failed to understand the social and economic demands of life in that area.
113
When informed of Paddon’s letter Davidson replied that “early in the war and before
the operation of the recruitment committee, I laid it down as a rule that we would not
receive as recruits for the regiment, married men living in Labrador or others having
women and children dependent on them. I think that this is a sound principal still. The
other parts are not relevant.”
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The Patriotic Association gave little attention to un-
derstanding why men chose not to enlist. This changed by the end of 1917 when the
Department of Militia requested recruiters provide feedback on why men refused to
enlist, but by then it was too late. The Colonial Secretary instructed the Recruiting
Committee to correct attitudes in the area and give the people a chance to “redeem”
their reputation.
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As of February 1917 2,802 men had signed up, of whom 435 were killed in ac-
tion, 212 had been discharged, 40 transferred to other units, 33 were listed as ineffec-
tive, 12 were prisoners of war, and a further 300 were in hospital. 782 men were on
active service, with three drafts totalling 467 men forthcoming. Despite these stark
facts, Davidson proposed forming a Newfoundland Forestry Corps of up to 1500
men.
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The men were to be dispatched by 15 May 1917, but recruitment proved to be
much harder than he had anticipated.
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What is most surprising about formation of
the Forestry Corps is that it followed Davidson’s report that 37 per cent of the total
standing of the regiment were no longer on active service (including 732 men perma-
nently removed from strength). The only real opposition to the formation of the corps
was the members of the Association who preferred that wood be cut in Newfound-
land and shipped to Britain. Davidson and John Harvey,
118
pointed out that the ex-
treme demand on shipping made such an effort impossible.
119
Few initially realised
that the Corps placed an added strain on the colony.
120
The same socioeconomic dy-
namic that affected men eligible for the regiment, affected those sought by the corps.
The failure to meet estimated goals for the corps placed added pressure on the Patriotic
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Association and its successor the Department of Militia as the colony now had two
units committed, in addition to the Naval Reserve, both struggling to meet required
levels of man power. In this light, it is hard to understand Davidson’s attempts in the
fall of 1917 to raise a further three Newfoundland service battalions, a mining com-
pany, an inland waterways transportation unit, and a railway construction company.
While plans for the waterways and railway units were hazy, the mining company
received Davidson’s full support. On 6 June 1917 Davidson put the Secretary of
State’s request to form a 250 man company of miners before the Executive Com-
mittee of the Foresters.
121
He displayed a lack of understanding of the manpower situ-
ation when he commented that “I only wish it were possible to impress upon the men
who readily work at Bell Island or Sydney the facts that the pay in the King’s service
is as good, the risk is not greater and the value of service rendered to the British flag
are infinitely high if they enlist for a years work in uniform.”
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It was not lack of en-
thusiasm or patriotism that kept miners from volunteering; it was the need to keep es-
sential industries functioning. Based on the 1911 census, there were 2,260 miners.
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By 1917, 74 of those serving in the Newfoundland regiment had listed their occupa-
tion as miner. The requirement to keep the industry viability should have been clear to
Davidson, as the shipping crises had led to a coal shortage.
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By early 1915 the Brit-
ish found that industries were being crippled by the enlistment of skilled workers and
coal output had declined 10 per cent. That country banned the enlistment of skilled
workers from essential industries including mining.
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In Newfoundland such provi-
sions were only instituted for cable operators. On 5 November 1917, the Minister of
Militia Bennett stated they would not attempt to recruit miners.
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By summer 1917 the political situation had changed. Morris’ fear of losing the
upcoming election prompted him to prolong the government’s life. After four weeks
of debate, on 16 July, the all parties amalgamated to form the National Government.
One of its first acts was to remove control of the war effort from Davidson and the
Patriotic Association. From that point, the government’s newly formed Department
of Militia held direct control of regimental affairs and recruiting.
127
The Patriotic Asso-
ciation’s “unofficial” status rendered it unable to enact mandatory service, and that im-
pediment was now gone.
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But widespread opposition led the Department of Militia to
refrain from doing so until they had exhausted all attempts to raise men voluntarily.
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Recruitment returns showed a worsening situation. From May to July only 190
men had volunteered and less than half were accepted. Both the Newfoundand Regi-
ment and Forestry Corps struggled to recruit men. Fighting around Monchy-le-Preux
that spring saw the staggering loss of 523 men, killed, wounded, missing, or captured.
In addition, fighting at Langemarck that summer and at Poelcappelle and Cambrai in
the fall exacted a further 679 casualties.
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1917 ended with recruiting returns drop-
ping below those of the previous two years (see Table 4). The incoming enlistees did
not match the level of casualties. From spring to the end of the year the major engage-
ments of the regiment had resulted in a total of 1,202 casualties, not including casual-
ties received during the daily grind of life in the trench (see Table 5).
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Table 4
Yearly Voluntary Enlistment Rates
1
Year Enlisted Rejected Total
19142 757 248 1,005
1915 1,418 1,326 2,744
1916 1,087 1,123 2,210
1917 1,031 974 2,005
19183 411 457 868
1Government of Newfoundland. Report of the Department of Militia (St. John’s: Harold
Print, 1919), 14-15.
2Totals for 1914 not exact as the Department of Militia included returns for December
1914 in the yearly returns for 1915.











1Based on information in Government of Newfoundland, Report of the Department of
Militia (St. John’s: Harold Print, 1919), 14-15; and G.W.L. Nicholson. The Fighting
Newfoundlander: A History of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment (London: Thomas
Nelson Printers, 1964).
2With exception of 1915, this figure only includes casualties received during major en-
gagements and does not account for men returned to active service during the course of
the war.
3
PANL, MG 632, File 1, Patriotic Association of Newfoundland, Meeting 4 February
1916. Casualties received by the regiment in Gallipoli were overwhelmingly caused by
disease and exposure to the elements, in particular the intense storm of 26 November
1915.
4The total for 1918 does not include men drawn into service under the Military Service
Act. Newfoundland conscripts did not receive combat casualties as the war ended prior
to their departure from England.
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Recruitment for the regiment that year had produced 2,005 volunteers, but
only 1,031 men were accepted. Reinforcements were needed if the Newfound-
land Regiment were to be kept in the front lines. Though the Department of Mi-
litia renewed its recruitment drive, conscription seemed inevitable to many.
1918: THE ELEVENTH HOUR. FAILURE AND CONSCRIPTION
The situation in 1918 was desperate. The regiment had lost more men than it could
replace, threatening to prematurely end their active service. The Colonial Secretary
made clear that qualified men were in short supply:
In the case of physical fitness combined with poor mentality, Major Macpherson
states that the best course would be to pass the man as Medically Fit. Then if the Offi-
cer in charge of his training finds that his mentality is not sufficient to take in the rudi-
ments of training, he would be sent before the Medical Board with a report of his
defects, and if necessary, discharged. Unless a man is almost an idiot, it would be hard
to turn him down on ordinary examination.
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The last ditch attempt to raise the men needed through the voluntary system
prompted the Department of Militia to ask for Canadian help in getting New-
foundlanders living in that county home so they could enlist.
132
This request arose
from the mistaken belief that the Canadian Military Service Act restricted the
movement of Newfoundlanders working there.The fact that the government now
discussed paying for the return of Newfoundlanders abroad stood in stark contrast
to the number of men they turned down in 1914 who had requested fares for passage
home to enlist. In February, Bennett also suggested hiring some “attractively im-
pressive and interesting lecturer” from Canada or the United States to “rouse the
people.”
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Bennett also prepared a report on the standing of the regiment and the enlist-
ment rates of each district as of 23 February 1918. The 1st Battalion had a total
strength of 648 men, of which 544 were on active duty. The others were listed as be-
ing in various hospitals, base depots, and convalescent depots. The standing of the
2nd battalion was much worse. Of its 1,288 men, 250 were newly arrived and un-
derage, 50 of previous drafts were under age, two were in isolation, 224 were under
training, 136 were “hardening,” 175 were temporarily unfit, 349 were undergoing
treatment, while six men were unfit for six months.
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Bennett provided an inaccu-
rate picture of the available manpower, measuring total enlistments against the total
male population of the district. When compared with a calculation based on males
of serviceable age the results differ significantly. Bennett showed that St. John’s
had a total male population of 45,685 men of whom 6 per cent enlisted in the regi-
ment. St. Barbe showed 10,481 men and a rate of 2 per cent, and Burgeo-La Poile
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7,793 men and a rate of 2 per cent. When limiting analysis to men between 15 and
35 the results are St. John’s 7,469 men, or 19 per cent, St. Barbe 1,899 men and 6 per
cent, Burgeo-La Poile 1,345 men and 6 per cent (for a complete comparison to all
districts see Table 6). Bennett’s flawed results, coupled with the belief that many
outport men were unpatriotic, encouraged conscription.
By March, as recruiting returns slipped below previous levels, officials voiced
recognition of the importance of working within the established patterns of eco-
nomic life. Bennett informed Morris that men would soon be coming out of the
lumber woods, so they should concentrate their efforts near Grand Falls, Miller-
town, and other areas where men logged. Any delay in recruiting these men would
result in poor returns as they would soon start preparing for the upcoming fishing
season and other various summer vocations.
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This pattern of life was evident in
the recruiting returns for the three month period of March, April, and May. From
1915 to 1917 the largest number of men enlisted during these three months. After
the influx of men in late winter and early spring, there was a marked decline in vol-
unteers. Levels remained significantly low until the fall when they began to in-
crease again.
While support for conscription grew, the National Government postponed its
implementation.
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By 9 April 1918, however, all hopes to avoid the establishment
of the Military Services Act had died. The British Army Council informed David-
son’s replacement, Governor Harris, that 1st Battalion was 170 men short of its of-
ficial establishment and 2nd Battalion did not have that many men available. The
colony needed to produce 300 men immediately and maintain a minimum of 60
men per month thereafter to replace expected casualties. This provoked an intense
recruitment campaign, but the new recruits did little to help the situation as the regi-
ment suffered more than 200 casualties in the fighting at Lys during the first half of
April. On 29 April 1918 the day many feared had finally come — the Regiment was
removed from its place within the 29th Division on the front lines.
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What happened in Newfoundland was similar to what had happened earlier in
Britain. When the British government announced a last ditch recruitment effort,
dubbed the “trial of volunteerism” by The Times, a large number of men, not want-
ing to be labelled conscripts, enlisted, the results were encouraging but ultimately
futile.
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In Newfoundland the threat of conscription had loomed for some time and
the events of April prompted many to enlist. Recruitment officers noted that many
men stated “they would not go until they had to, and when they had to then they
would go.”
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While the trial of volunteerism lasted for eight weeks in Britain, in
Newfoundland it had lasted much longer. By the end of 1917 recruiting campaigns
made clear that they would be the last such campaign before mandatory service was
implemented, and they repeated the same ominous warning in early 1918. This in-
decisiveness and continuation of the “final” call for volunteers attracted the criti-




Report on Enlistments per District as of 23 February 1918
1


















St. John’s4 1,428 22,233 6.4 7,469 19.1
Bonavista 285 11,972 2.4 4,064 7.0
Twillingate 528 11,875 4.4 4,181 12.6
Trinity 401 11,372 3.5 3,717 10.8
Placentia &
St. Mary’s 163 8,368 1.9 2,758 5.91
Harbour Grace 72 5,987 1.2 1,922 3.7
St. George 165 6,225 2.7 1,961 8.4
Burin 118 5,850 2.0 1,824 6.5
St. Barbe 121 5,578 2.2 1,899 6.4
Bay de Verde 60 5,289 1.1 1,696 3.5
Fortune Bay 116 5,209 2.2 1,775 6.5
Harbour Main 107 4,940 2.2 1,638 6.5
Fogo 92 4,388 2.1 1,579 5.8
Burgeo-La Poile 81 4,095 2.0 1,345 6.0
Port de Grave 122 3,601 3.4 1,087 11.2
Ferryland 66 3,029 2.2 866 7.6
Carbonear 30 2,567 1.2 816 3.7
1
PANL, MG 632, File 21(e), Prime Ministers Office 1918, Report Minister of Militia to
Prime Minister, 23 February 1918.
2Calculated using Bennett’s 23 February 1918 report.
3Calculated using Bennett’s returns and Census of Newfoundland and Labrador 1911,
Table 1. Population, Sex, Denomination, Profession & c. (St. John’s: J.W. Withers,
1914).
4Includes both St. John’s East and St. John’s West districts.
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On 8 April 1918 Bennett wrote the newly appointed Newfoundland Prime
Minister W.F. Lloyd reporting that the Regimental officers involved in the re-
cruiting campaign believed that unless the government provided “some new and
strong backing” to the endeavour, the results would be poor. Furthermore, they
warned it would be folly to not follow through on the preceding year’s commitment
that it would be the last effort to solicit volunteers.
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The problems in the operation of
the voluntary recruitment system had begun under the direction of Davidson and the
Patriotic Association, but despite having been established to bring the war effort un-
der full control of the government, the Department of Militia did little to make re-
cruitment a national endeavour.
On 11 May 1918 the government enacted the Military Service Act. Though
conscription had considerable support in the city, it was unpopular in the outports.
Rural residents felt that mandatory service threatened their livelihood and that the
government unjustly placed the burden on their shoulders. The Military Service
Act prohibited men of serviceable age from leaving the country, even by participat-
ing in the offshore fishery. The Act, instituted in time to ensure that young men
could not leave for the summer, hurt those who had already obtained the upcoming
season’s supplies on credit. Joseph Serviouer of Gaskiers wrote that his crew in-
cluded men of serviceable age and given their restriction of movement he could not
participate in that season’s fishery. Without a catch, he would be unable to repay the
debt for the $7,000 worth of equipment he had purchased. He also criticized the
government for overestimating the number of men available in his area. Serviouer
raised a valid point. Many men were away from the island working or serving in
British and Canadian units, yet the absence of these men had not been taken into ac-
count when the government made its calculations. The Rules and Regulations also
dictated that men who had been previously rejected, even those who had been is-
sued an official rejection badge, were eligible for draft and it was their responsibil-
ity to “report for service or apply to the Tribunal for exemption.”
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The belief that the outports were unfairly targeted through the Military Service
Act led John J. Roberts of Vallyfield, Badgers Quay, to telegraph Lloyd shortly
before its implementation, to inform him that “if conscription passes no votes elec-
tion time, half schooners won’t get fishing.”
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The Patriotic Association’s long
held belief that the outports lagged behind because of disinterest in Empire matters,
along with the Department of Militia’s recognition that the extra inducements put
forward to persuade outport men to enlist had failed,
143
was made evident in the dis-
tribution of men called forward under the Military Service Act. From 11 May 1918
through to the end of the war the Department of Militia called a total of 1,470 men
into active service. The three districts that produced the largest number of men were
Bonavista 230, Twillingate 194, and Trinity with 156 men each. By comparison,
both city districts produced a combined total of 136 men.
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The three rural districts
also had a higher percentage of conscripts per eligible male population than the












Bonavista 11,972 230 5.6
Twillingate 11,875 194 4.6
Trinity 11,372 156 4.2
St. John’s 22,233 136 1.8
Fortune Bay 5,209 120 6.8
Placentia & St. Mary’s 8,368 110 4.0
St. Georges 6,225 83 4.2
Fogo 4,388 78 4.9
Burin 5,850 66 3.6
Harbour Grace 5,987 58 3.0
Burgeo-La Poile 4,095 51 3.8
Bay de Verde 5,289 41 2.4
Harbour Main 4,940 40 2.4
Ferryland 3,029 35 4.0
Port de Grave 3,601 32 3.0
St. Barbe 5,578 16 0.8
Carbonear 2,567 30 3.7
Labrador2 2,052 14 2.0
1Based on information presented in Sharpe. The Race of Honour, 39; and Census of
Newfoundland and Labrador 1911, Table 1. Population, Sex, Denomination, Profession
& c. (St. John’s: J.W. Withers, 1914).
2Labrador was not an electoral district in 1911.
per cent, Twillingate 5 per cent, and Trinity 4 per cent. It is no coincidence that
these three districts were the area Davidson and the Patriotic Association thought
lacked patriotism. Except for St. Barbe, all outlying districts had a higher percentage
than St. John’s, the highest of which was Fortune Bay with nearly 7 per cent of its
eligible male population conscripted (see Table 7).
CONCLUSION
Since 1916, officials in St John’s increasingly criticised outport communities’ com-
mitment to the war effort. When conscription was finally introduced these areas
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were specifically targeted and a disproportionate number of conscripts were drawn
from areas such as the north coast. The districts of Twillingate, Fogo, Bonavista, and
Trinity accounted for about 45 per cent of conscripts. National and regional enlist-
ment rates show that St. John’s commitment to the regiment was significant. 15 per
cent of the island’s male population between 15 and 35 were accepted for service in
the Newfoundland Regiment. St. John’s enlistment rate was well above the na-
tional as 24 per cent of eligible men enlisted, while the outport commitment was
slightly below the national rate at 13 per cent. Though the disparity between urban
and rural enlistments led many individuals during and after the war to criticize the
outport men, such views do not take into account the fact that the bulk of the col-
ony’s population was spread out over a large geographic area and that the New-
foundland fishery was dominated by household production. An outport fishing
family dependent on the labour of all its members could not easily compensate for
the absence of its young men, whereas a clerk in St. John’s could be replaced.
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While outport populations changed little during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the demographics of St. John’s had changed considerably. In-
creasing dominance in the colony’s industry and commerce caused a marked popu-
lation increase. Between 1900 and 1910 the city’s population increased by 15 per
cent, which resulted in a 72 per cent increase in the city’s labour force. Many of
these labourers found employment in the secondary manufacturing sector; employ-
ees in this sector rose from 18 to 26 per cent over the decade.
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For most St. John’s
residents, household production had long since been replaced by wages. Similar
patterns are evident in the United Kingdom. Voluntary enlistments in rural areas
dropped while urban enlistments rose in a manner that was directly contradictory to
pre war patterns. The average enlistment rate for Britain from August 1914 to May
1915 was 30 per cent. Urban counties averaged above that number while rural coun-
ties averaged below. The counties of Cornwall, Yorkshire and Cheshire had the lar-
gest percentage of rural workers in England and no major urban centers. Their com-
bined enlistment rate of 25 per cent was below the national.
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By April 1918 the voluntary recruitment system had failed to maintain the
Regiment at strength. Low enlistments and heavy casualties had seen to that. Though
some historians have argued that high cod prices, poor communication and over
confidence of city officials were responsible for the poor enlistment rate, I argue
that it was unrealistic to expect the colony to support a combat unit with the exem-
plary service record of the Newfoundland Regiment. The numerous distinctions
and honours bestowed upon the regiment came at a heavy price. During four years
the Regiment suffered 3,564 casualties, including 1,232 fatalities. The Patriotic As-
sociation’s ad hoc management of recruitment and limited understanding of life
outside the capital led to the belief that the colony could field many units. Their con-
viction that all Newfoundlanders should offer themselves up based on their duty to
King and Empire, overlooked the nature of the labour force. Rather than figuring
out how to draw men from a country dominated by household production, the Asso-
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ciation believed the call to duty would be enough. The Department of Militia con-
tinued to believe this when it took over in the summer of 1917. Though the Depart-
ment made an attempt to understand the reasons behind the poor returns, the volun-
tary recruitment system had already failed and conscription was the only option.
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